The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005 (November), 120 (4), 1413-1444. (with Craig O. Brown)
This paper studies large private banks in 21 major emerging markets in the 1990s. It first demonstrates that bank failures are very common in these countries: About 25 percent of these banks failed during the seven-year sample period. The paper also shows that political concerns play a significant role in delaying government interventions to failing banks. Failing banks are much less likely to be taken over by the government or to lose their licenses before elections than after. This result is robust to controlling for macroeconomic and bank-specific factors, a new party in power, early elections, outstanding loans from IMF, as well as country-specific, time-independent factors. This finding implies that much of the within-country clustering in emerging market bank failures is directly due to political concerns.
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